1. Número 1 · Enero 2015

  2. Número 2 · Enero 2015

  3. Número 3 · Enero 2015

  4. Número 4 · Febrero 2015

  5. Número 5 · Febrero 2015

  6. Número 6 · Febrero 2015

  7. Número 7 · Febrero 2015

  8. Número 8 · Marzo 2015

  9. Número 9 · Marzo 2015

  10. Número 10 · Marzo 2015

  11. Número 11 · Marzo 2015

  12. Número 12 · Abril 2015

  13. Número 13 · Abril 2015

  14. Número 14 · Abril 2015

  15. Número 15 · Abril 2015

  16. Número 16 · Mayo 2015

  17. Número 17 · Mayo 2015

  18. Número 18 · Mayo 2015

  19. Número 19 · Mayo 2015

  20. Número 20 · Junio 2015

  21. Número 21 · Junio 2015

  22. Número 22 · Junio 2015

  23. Número 23 · Junio 2015

  24. Número 24 · Julio 2015

  25. Número 25 · Julio 2015

  26. Número 26 · Julio 2015

  27. Número 27 · Julio 2015

  28. Número 28 · Septiembre 2015

  29. Número 29 · Septiembre 2015

  30. Número 30 · Septiembre 2015

  31. Número 31 · Septiembre 2015

  32. Número 32 · Septiembre 2015

  33. Número 33 · Octubre 2015

  34. Número 34 · Octubre 2015

  35. Número 35 · Octubre 2015

  36. Número 36 · Octubre 2015

  37. Número 37 · Noviembre 2015

  38. Número 38 · Noviembre 2015

  39. Número 39 · Noviembre 2015

  40. Número 40 · Noviembre 2015

  41. Número 41 · Diciembre 2015

  42. Número 42 · Diciembre 2015

  43. Número 43 · Diciembre 2015

  44. Número 44 · Diciembre 2015

  45. Número 45 · Diciembre 2015

  46. Número 46 · Enero 2016

  47. Número 47 · Enero 2016

  48. Número 48 · Enero 2016

  49. Número 49 · Enero 2016

  50. Número 50 · Febrero 2016

  51. Número 51 · Febrero 2016

  52. Número 52 · Febrero 2016

  53. Número 53 · Febrero 2016

  54. Número 54 · Marzo 2016

  55. Número 55 · Marzo 2016

  56. Número 56 · Marzo 2016

  57. Número 57 · Marzo 2016

  58. Número 58 · Marzo 2016

  59. Número 59 · Abril 2016

  60. Número 60 · Abril 2016

  61. Número 61 · Abril 2016

  62. Número 62 · Abril 2016

  63. Número 63 · Mayo 2016

  64. Número 64 · Mayo 2016

  65. Número 65 · Mayo 2016

  66. Número 66 · Mayo 2016

  67. Número 67 · Junio 2016

  68. Número 68 · Junio 2016

  69. Número 69 · Junio 2016

  70. Número 70 · Junio 2016

  71. Número 71 · Junio 2016

  72. Número 72 · Julio 2016

  73. Número 73 · Julio 2016

  74. Número 74 · Julio 2016

  75. Número 75 · Julio 2016

  76. Número 76 · Agosto 2016

  77. Número 77 · Agosto 2016

  78. Número 78 · Agosto 2016

  79. Número 79 · Agosto 2016

  80. Número 80 · Agosto 2016

  81. Número 81 · Septiembre 2016

  82. Número 82 · Septiembre 2016

  83. Número 83 · Septiembre 2016

  84. Número 84 · Septiembre 2016

  85. Número 85 · Octubre 2016

  86. Número 86 · Octubre 2016

  87. Número 87 · Octubre 2016

  88. Número 88 · Octubre 2016

  89. Número 89 · Noviembre 2016

  90. Número 90 · Noviembre 2016

  91. Número 91 · Noviembre 2016

  92. Número 92 · Noviembre 2016

  93. Número 93 · Noviembre 2016

  94. Número 94 · Diciembre 2016

  95. Número 95 · Diciembre 2016

  96. Número 96 · Diciembre 2016

  97. Número 97 · Diciembre 2016

  98. Número 98 · Enero 2017

  99. Número 99 · Enero 2017

  100. Número 100 · Enero 2017

  101. Número 101 · Enero 2017

  102. Número 102 · Febrero 2017

  103. Número 103 · Febrero 2017

  104. Número 104 · Febrero 2017

  105. Número 105 · Febrero 2017

  106. Número 106 · Marzo 2017

  107. Número 107 · Marzo 2017

  108. Número 108 · Marzo 2017

  109. Número 109 · Marzo 2017

  110. Número 110 · Marzo 2017

  111. Número 111 · Abril 2017

  112. Número 112 · Abril 2017

  113. Número 113 · Abril 2017

  114. Número 114 · Abril 2017

  115. Número 115 · Mayo 2017

  116. Número 116 · Mayo 2017

  117. Número 117 · Mayo 2017

  118. Número 118 · Mayo 2017

  119. Número 119 · Mayo 2017

  120. Número 120 · Junio 2017

  121. Número 121 · Junio 2017

  122. Número 122 · Junio 2017

  123. Número 123 · Junio 2017

  124. Número 124 · Julio 2017

  125. Número 125 · Julio 2017

  126. Número 126 · Julio 2017

  127. Número 127 · Julio 2017

  128. Número 128 · Agosto 2017

  129. Número 129 · Agosto 2017

  130. Número 130 · Agosto 2017

  131. Número 131 · Agosto 2017

  132. Número 132 · Agosto 2017

  133. Número 133 · Septiembre 2017

  134. Número 134 · Septiembre 2017

  135. Número 135 · Septiembre 2017

  136. Número 136 · Septiembre 2017

  137. Número 137 · Octubre 2017

  138. Número 138 · Octubre 2017

  139. Número 139 · Octubre 2017

  140. Número 140 · Octubre 2017

  141. Número 141 · Noviembre 2017

  142. Número 142 · Noviembre 2017

  143. Número 143 · Noviembre 2017

  144. Número 144 · Noviembre 2017

  145. Número 145 · Noviembre 2017

  146. Número 146 · Diciembre 2017

  147. Número 147 · Diciembre 2017

  148. Número 148 · Diciembre 2017

  149. Número 149 · Diciembre 2017

  150. Número 150 · Enero 2018

  151. Número 151 · Enero 2018

  152. Número 152 · Enero 2018

  153. Número 153 · Enero 2018

  154. Número 154 · Enero 2018

  155. Número 155 · Febrero 2018

  156. Número 156 · Febrero 2018

  157. Número 157 · Febrero 2018

  158. Número 158 · Febrero 2018

  159. Número 159 · Marzo 2018

  160. Número 160 · Marzo 2018

  161. Número 161 · Marzo 2018

  162. Número 162 · Marzo 2018

  163. Número 163 · Abril 2018

  164. Número 164 · Abril 2018

  165. Número 165 · Abril 2018

  166. Número 166 · Abril 2018

  167. Número 167 · Mayo 2018

  168. Número 168 · Mayo 2018

  169. Número 169 · Mayo 2018

  170. Número 170 · Mayo 2018

  171. Número 171 · Mayo 2018

  172. Número 172 · Junio 2018

  173. Número 173 · Junio 2018

  174. Número 174 · Junio 2018

  175. Número 175 · Junio 2018

  176. Número 176 · Julio 2018

  177. Número 177 · Julio 2018

  178. Número 178 · Julio 2018

  179. Número 179 · Julio 2018

  180. Número 180 · Agosto 2018

  181. Número 181 · Agosto 2018

  182. Número 182 · Agosto 2018

  183. Número 183 · Agosto 2018

  184. Número 184 · Agosto 2018

  185. Número 185 · Septiembre 2018

  186. Número 186 · Septiembre 2018

  187. Número 187 · Septiembre 2018

  188. Número 188 · Septiembre 2018

  189. Número 189 · Octubre 2018

  190. Número 190 · Octubre 2018

  191. Número 191 · Octubre 2018

  192. Número 192 · Octubre 2018

  193. Número 193 · Octubre 2018

  194. Número 194 · Noviembre 2018

  195. Número 195 · Noviembre 2018

  196. Número 196 · Noviembre 2018

  197. Número 197 · Noviembre 2018

  198. Número 198 · Diciembre 2018

  199. Número 199 · Diciembre 2018

  200. Número 200 · Diciembre 2018

  201. Número 201 · Diciembre 2018

  202. Número 202 · Enero 2019

  203. Número 203 · Enero 2019

  204. Número 204 · Enero 2019

  205. Número 205 · Enero 2019

  206. Número 206 · Enero 2019

  207. Número 207 · Febrero 2019

  208. Número 208 · Febrero 2019

  209. Número 209 · Febrero 2019

  210. Número 210 · Febrero 2019

  211. Número 211 · Marzo 2019

  212. Número 212 · Marzo 2019

  213. Número 213 · Marzo 2019

  214. Número 214 · Marzo 2019

  215. Número 215 · Abril 2019

  216. Número 216 · Abril 2019

  217. Número 217 · Abril 2019

  218. Número 218 · Abril 2019

  219. Número 219 · Mayo 2019

  220. Número 220 · Mayo 2019

  221. Número 221 · Mayo 2019

  222. Número 222 · Mayo 2019

  223. Número 223 · Mayo 2019

  224. Número 224 · Junio 2019

  225. Número 225 · Junio 2019

  226. Número 226 · Junio 2019

  227. Número 227 · Junio 2019

  228. Número 228 · Julio 2019

  229. Número 229 · Julio 2019

  230. Número 230 · Julio 2019

  231. Número 231 · Julio 2019

  232. Número 232 · Julio 2019

  233. Número 233 · Agosto 2019

  234. Número 234 · Agosto 2019

  235. Número 235 · Agosto 2019

  236. Número 236 · Agosto 2019

  237. Número 237 · Septiembre 2019

  238. Número 238 · Septiembre 2019

  239. Número 239 · Septiembre 2019

  240. Número 240 · Septiembre 2019

  241. Número 241 · Octubre 2019

  242. Número 242 · Octubre 2019

  243. Número 243 · Octubre 2019

  244. Número 244 · Octubre 2019

  245. Número 245 · Octubre 2019

  246. Número 246 · Noviembre 2019

  247. Número 247 · Noviembre 2019

  248. Número 248 · Noviembre 2019

  249. Número 249 · Noviembre 2019

  250. Número 250 · Diciembre 2019

  251. Número 251 · Diciembre 2019

  252. Número 252 · Diciembre 2019

  253. Número 253 · Diciembre 2019

  254. Número 254 · Enero 2020

  255. Número 255 · Enero 2020

  256. Número 256 · Enero 2020

  257. Número 257 · Febrero 2020

  258. Número 258 · Marzo 2020

  259. Número 259 · Abril 2020

  260. Número 260 · Mayo 2020

  261. Número 261 · Junio 2020

  262. Número 262 · Julio 2020

  263. Número 263 · Agosto 2020

  264. Número 264 · Septiembre 2020

  265. Número 265 · Octubre 2020

  266. Número 266 · Noviembre 2020

  267. Número 267 · Diciembre 2020

  268. Número 268 · Enero 2021

  269. Número 269 · Febrero 2021

  270. Número 270 · Marzo 2021

  271. Número 271 · Abril 2021

  272. Número 272 · Mayo 2021

  273. Número 273 · Junio 2021

  274. Número 274 · Julio 2021

  275. Número 275 · Agosto 2021

  276. Número 276 · Septiembre 2021

  277. Número 277 · Octubre 2021

CTXT necesita 15.000 socias/os para seguir creciendo. Suscríbete a CTXT

Joseph Stiglitz / Economista

“We need to have social protection without protectionism”

Álvaro Guzmán Bastida / Ignasi Gozalo Salellas / Héctor Muniente Sariñena Nueva York , 15/11/2018

<p>Joseph Stiglitz. </p>

Joseph Stiglitz. 

Ignasi Gozalo

A diferencia de otros medios, en CTXT mantenemos todos nuestros artículos en abierto. Nuestra apuesta es recuperar el espíritu de la prensa independiente: ser un servicio público. Si puedes permitirte pagar 4 euros al mes, apoya a CTXT. ¡Suscríbete!

The world appears determined to teach Prof. Joseph Stiglitz a lesson. After serving in the Clinton administration and heading the World Bank in the mid- and late-nineties, later earning a Nobel Prize in 2001, the Columbia University economist went on to become one of the fiercest critics of both the Democratic Party’s abandonment of the American working class and, crucially, globalization’s inequities and power imbalances vis-à-vis the Global South. Then Donald Trump came along. And, once again, Stiglitz rose to the challenge, deepening and broadening his critique. How is it possible that the system he lambasted for leaving poor Africans and Latin American farmers behind could give birth to a political monstrosity claiming to speak to the “forgotten men” of the United States? Could America be a loser in the global system it helped create and worked hard to impose? Stiglitz, who has updated his seminal work Globalization and its Discontents to account for these new developments, sits down with CTXT at his office in Upper Manhattan to discuss the coming trade war with China, the inadequacy of a geopolitical analysis of globalization that leaves class aside and the urgency of social protection as an antidote against the rise of both reactionaries and neo-protectionists.

The last time we spoke, in the spring of 2016, you had a lot to say about the crisis of inequality in America and the failings of the recovery. What's happened since, of course, is the rise of Trump. I wonder if you think there's an economic explanation to why Trump arose. What is the material strata upon which he took hold?

Anything as complex as Trump can't be explained just by economics, but I do think that there is an underlying economic factor. That is the reality that I talked about then, but things have gotten worse since then, as large fractions of America, and particularly American men, have not done well. So the median income of full-time male workers—and full-time workers are the lucky ones—is lower than it was 42 years ago. Real wage is at the same level as 60 years ago. These are just striking statistics describing a half-century of stagnation for very large fractions of the country when, meanwhile, a few people at the top have done very, very well. It used to be that virtually every young person could expect to live better than their parents. Now, it's just about 50 percent of young people who can expect to be better off than their parents, so the notion of progress for a majority of Americans, or a large fraction, is over. 

Health and life expectancy in America are in decline. And among white males who do not have a college education, they're precipitously in decline. Much of it is related to what Anne Case and Angus Deaton call "deaths of despair,” suicide, drug overdose, alcoholism. So these are all what I call extreme symptoms of a social disease and underlying it all is the process of deindustrialization has left large parts of America bereft.

The critical moment in this history may have been the financial crisis, because it marked the point of people really seeing the end of manufacturing. People lost their homes, they lost their jobs, they lost their hope. And at the same time, the U.S. government spent hundreds of billions of dollars bailing out the bankers who had caused the problems and it was inevitable, I think, or at least very likely that the refrain, "the system is rigged," would come up. It came up from the Left, the Occupy movement, Occupy Wall Street. It came on the Right, from Trump. 

There's something curious though, about this notion of America being presented as a loser from globalization, and that having political sway. As you point out, the U.S. is still very much a world hegemon, and it has unprecedented global military power and holds a veto for the IMF like no other country does. Is the U.S. really a loser from globalization?

No. That's what Trump claims, but Trump is famously and enormously ignorant and does not understand anything, except he has an intuition about underlying grievances and how to play on people's anxieties. So, saying that trade agreements are unfair is part of blaming others. He forgets that NAFTA was actually negotiated by President Bush of his own party. I’ve watched the process of negotiating the trade agreements and it's very clear. The U.S. basically dictates the terms of those agreements. They are American-crafted agreements.

You also connect the rise of Trump to sort of an overall decline in American influence, measured by everything from soft power to the global balance of economic power. Is Trump a symptom of America's imperial decline?

There is one interpretation that this is what some people call a Thucydides moment, that when Persia was in decline, relative to Greece, there was a lot of thrashing around, a moment of global conflict. And there are certainly symptoms of that which were present under Obama. For instance, TPP, which was trying to contain China, was very ill-conceived. It was not a good trade agreement, even for the United States.

Geoeconomics and geopolitics say that China has gone from a very, very small country to one of purchasing power parity that's actually larger than the United States, but even in normal exchange rate metrics, in 30 years it will be much larger than the United States. And all of a sudden, people realized that, from the collapse of the Berlin Wall until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we were dominant. And now the American model doesn't have the shine and the dominance that it did over that long period of time.

Much of your analysis prior to this revised edition was about how globalization had so many detrimental effects, especially in the Global South and developing countries. So, in comes Trump and you say he throws in a hand grenade to the global system, global economic system. Some people who've read your work and admire it might say, "So what? Down with the system that created so many injustices." What are they missing? 

The arrival of Trump has made people think much more carefully about what is good and bad about globalization. And it's not until you see the threat to the system that you start to appreciate it. 740 million Chinese moved out of poverty, the largest movement of people out of poverty probably in the history of the world in such a short span of time. And globalization played a very big role. The growth of the middle class and Africa, India, China, clearly globalization has played a role. Under some metrics, global inequality has actually come down. And again, globalization has played a role, even if inequality in the United States, Europe, has gone up. But the way I think about it even more strongly is we can't conceive of running our own domestic economy without a rule of law. If we're going to have trade, we have to have rules. And the alternative to a rules-based system is the law of the jungle. 

Now, having said that, in our own democracies we are always fighting to make sure we have the right laws. Feudalism was a rule of law, but it wasn't a very good rule of law. It was all the power with a few people, and they had an enormous amount of potential abuse of power. The same thing applies in financial sectors, where you see a rampant abuse of power. We know all the ways in which we can write laws to advantage the few at the expense of the many, but in our democracies we fight to have legal frameworks that protect the weak against the strong and to have a fair rule of law.

Are you saying that this pitting of countries against each other, as the mainstream narratives of globalization go, is short-sighted? Should we have more of a class analysis of globalization?

First, I'm saying, yes, it is more of a class analysis, what you could call class or corporate interest versus workers, and it is very much that. That's really what's been going on at a global level.  But I'm also saying that Trump's view that the world is basically zero-sum is fundamentally wrong. That if you run globalization in the right way, it's positive-sum. If China grows it will buy more of our goods and we will take advantage of this by buying more of their goods so that we can both be better off. But what we forget is that even if America as a whole is better off, even if Europe is always better off, there may be large groups, even a majority within the country, that are worse off. European unskilled workers have been made worse off and the countries that I think have more sensitive politics, more democratic politics, they've tried to protect workers.

When critiquing these 40 years of globalization and its many discontents now from a different perspective, you talk about how this hegemonic notion of free-trade that was pushed by the Left and Right across the world is actually a little misleading. You talk about “managed trade” instead. What do you mean? Managed by whom? And to accomplish what?

The way I try to summarize this is: If you really had free trade, very simple, you’d get rid of all your trade barriers, all your non-tariff barriers and all your subsidies, and if you did that it'd be a very short agreement. That was the one point of honesty of Trump. It’s not about free trade; they recognize this is managed trade, for a particular interest.

It's not clear whether even auto workers are going to be better off. It's not clear whether auto companies will be better off because costs are going to go up. Those increases in cost are going to reflect in prices, demand for American cars will go down, they will become less competitive. So, it’s not clear who the winner is. It’s not clear either about the increase in steel tariffs. The users of steel are going to be worse off. And there are many more jobs using steel than producing steel. So, workers collectively are going to be worse off.

So, take those people you say personally felt those damages. Do you think Trump is going to deliver for them? 

No. No, not at all. They're going to be worse off and we're already beginning to see that. His tax bill will increase taxes for a majority of people in the second, third, and fourth quintile—in other words, for the vast middle class—when it's finally implemented. Thirteen million more Americans will be without healthcare as a result of this tax bill in a country where life expectancy is already on the decline. The trade deficit is reaching new heights, partly because of the macroeconomics that he's put into place. All of these are part of a story that I don’t think is going to turn out very well.

Now, the positive side of that is it stimulates the economy in the short run. It's not sustainable, but it stimulated the economy, unemployment went down. And maybe, eventually, that will drive up wages a little bit. And you're beginning to see this, but still, it's just remarkable how weak things are in terms of wages. And I think it's partly because and even in terms of the stimulus that it's provided, because who are the big winners of this tax bill? Real estate developers. The big losers? Think education, local government.

But you also say this project to re-industrialize America or even the core country in now the industrialized west, it's kind of anachronistic. You don't think that is going to work or should be the objective, right?

Well, no. Productivity manufacturing has so outpaced demand that global employment in manufacturing is going down. We're the victims of our own success. Just like 75 years ago, 100 years ago, it used to be that 70 percent of the population needed to produce the food we eat, now it's two percent, three percent. Nobody would say, to keep the economy going we have to go back to a world where 70 percent of people are working in farms. You're not going to do it and it would not be the right way to do it. So my view on manufacturing is the same thing. We may get an increase in manufacturing output, but it'll be robots. There are not going to be many jobs. That's the economic reality, and I'd rather us think about how to create a 21st-century economy, not try to move back in history and do something that we can't do.

You mentioned China a couple of times and the effects that increased trade with a rising China might have. China also holds a lot of the U.S. debt, but are we moving towards a trade war with China? Is that the direction the world is going in?

Yes, unfortunately. I was naïve enough to say, like most people, you might say, who think that corporations have run America for a long time, how could they let that happen? That the corporations would be among the losers. So all your theories of politics are also thrown aside and, yeah, Trump seems to relentlessly be moving towards a trade war. And the way he's doing it makes it very likely that it will last a long time. Why I say that is the following: he makes demands of China that they cannot accede to.

Now there are lots of things you can agree with, you can bargain over. Historically, the U.S. has asked China to open up its insurance markets, financial markets. China would agree to that. You negotiate then about the years, the pay, the number of American firms, the terms. There's a lot to negotiate, but you can reach a compromise. But the United States says China has to give up on its 2025 strategy to become a more advanced country. No country would accept that demand.

What would the consequences be if we did have a trade war?

We are both heavily dependent. The reason we buy lots of clothes and lots of other things from China is because it's much cheaper. Now, we'll be able to buy textiles from other countries, we won't be making the textiles in the United States. We may have some robots making textiles, but not a lot. But we'll buy from Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, Vietnam. It won't much help American workers, it's just that our consumers will pay a little bit more than they otherwise would have paid. So we won't gain jobs, it will cost us a little bit, I don't know, 10, 20 percent more.

You said earlier that you didn't predict a trade war like this would happen because the corporations wouldn't want it and they have so much power in America. Trump certainly wasn’t the preferred candidate of Wall Street or Silicon Valley. But still, it’s hard to imagine him governing against the interests of his class or the people who fund his party. Are we witnessing a split within the American ruling class?

Well, there are two interesting aspects of this. American corporations have been much quieter about this trade war than I had anticipated. And there are two hypotheses. One is that they're afraid of Trump. But there's another part, which is that for 20 years they looked at China as a gold mine. They can produce there with low wages, no environmental standards, limited competition. That's changed. Environmental standards are going up, wages are going up, competition inside of China is going up, and so what's happening is that China is no longer the gold mine that they had thought.

But there is a split in the Republican Party and you see it most vociferously in the Koch Brothers. Big Tea Party donors, Tea Party supporters. Big supporters of getting out of Paris, agreements against climate change, acting against climate change. But they're also very strong internationalists.

Do you think he's opening a new path for the future regarding the global system? Are we witnessing something new? A third way of sorts? Or is this a kind of impasse between the last 40 last years of globalization and something that isn’t fully formed yet?

No, I think Trump represents a distinctly American version of what is a global trend and what is inward-looking, nativism, anti-migration, skepticism about globalization. In reality, no one wants to do without their iPhones, no one wants to pay 50 percent more for their clothes. So the reality is that it's hard to see that we would back away from globalization as we have it, but it's also clear that we've gotten most of the gains from global integration and the next steps are not likely to be that much more fruitful and may represent the hardest part.

This neo-protectionist turn, from Trump to Brexit, has components about trade, but it also has a facet that's very hostile to immigration, which it tries to limit by criminalizing immigrants. What are the economic consequences of those policies?

In one way or another, those policies are harking back to what was at one time the heart of the Republican Party, isolationism. America turning in on itself. But that was before World War I and II, before America was the dominant global power that it is today. The United States has played a very important role in trying to coordinate globalization, trying to support a rules-based system, even though, as I say, I don't always agree with the rules they push. And if the U.S. instead becomes isolationist and against international law, it's going to have profound implications for the advance of the global rule of law. From the end of World War II until Trump, we've been at the center of it for better or worse, and now with Trump we seem to be withdrawing from it. And when it comes to all kinds of issues, the International Criminal Court, dealing with genocide, all those things, not having the U.S. at the table is a very bad thing.

From your analysis of corporations benefiting from globalization at the expense of workers and even from things, like you just said, like the Koch Brothers being proponents of internationalism, some might be tempted to come up with a potential option that's sort of a progressive program that includes a certain protectionist element. I gather you're against that progressive solution. Why?

We need to have social protection without protectionism. What I care about is social protection and maintaining a dynamic economy, re-shifting to more dynamic sectors. And that requires active labor market policies, industrial policies, and social protection. You just can't let yourself open up to money that can come in and out overnight. When I said the rules of the game had been designed by corporations, that's a good example. So we have to manage globalization, including managing the downside risks. And that begins by recognizing that not everybody's going to be a winner and we have to try to make sure the way we manage it has large winners.

So how do you defeat not just Trump, but Trumpism? What is to be done?

For me the answer is the progressive social democratic agenda. People are not going to be confident if you say, “don't worry about trade, we'll protect your jobs.” That's not credible anymore. It might have been credible 40 years ago. Not today. Let’s say you have an overall economic framework of what we call the welfare state and we say we want to make sure, whether it's from technology or globalization or financialization, that you have work, but we're going to give you a certain degree of protection. That would make people more receptive. And I think we also need to increase the openness and democratic transparency in our government. Because too many of these agreements were done in secret or without adequate discussion.

The key issue is for people to understand that the government cares about them and that it is committed to making sure that everybody in our country can attain a basically middle class lifestyle as long as they're willing to work and that we will make sure that there will be a job. We will give them the training, we will give them the opportunity. So to me, that social protection then gives people the confidence to be open, not only to globalization, but also to some of the real challenges in technology going forward that we’re going to be facing.

The world appears determined to teach Prof. Joseph Stiglitz a lesson. After serving in the Clinton administration and heading the World Bank in the mid- and late-nineties, later earning a Nobel Prize in 2001, the Columbia University economist went on to become one of the fiercest critics of both the Democratic...

El artículo solo se encuentra publicado para las personas suscritas a CTXT. Puedes suscribirte aquí

Autor >

Álvaro Guzmán Bastida / Ignasi Gozalo Salellas / Héctor Muniente Sariñena

Suscríbete a CTXT

Orgullosas
de llegar tarde
a las últimas noticias

Gracias a tu suscripción podemos ejercer un periodismo público y en libertad.
¿Quieres suscribirte a CTXT por solo 6 euros al mes? Pulsa aquí

Artículos relacionados >

4 comentario(s)

¿Quieres decir algo? + Déjanos un comentario

  1. José Lázaro

    No creo q la violencia cultural sea un fenómeno asociado exclusivamente a la globalización (...cuánto podríamos hablar del Reino de Castilla.. del de hace 500 años y del de hoy mismo!) De hecho el Inglés pierde fuelle según la globalización se intensifica (barrios enteros en las capitales africanas hablando Chino, o barrios enteros en las ciudades estadounidenses hablando Español). No por ello rechazo la idea de la violencia cultural.. Si cabe. de nuevo, desligada del capitalismo, pq tb otros regímenes han extendido su esfera cultural o otros pueblos y estados (y ahora me estoy refiriendo a la URSS o a la China de Mao). Históricamente hablando ha habido imperios, como el Romano o el Turco, q impusieron sus leyes y sus tasas, sus lenguas y sus dioses tb, pero no destruyeron las crencias o las culturas de los pueblos sometidos.. aunque por supuesto las relegaron. Pero al retirarse esos imperios, se recuperaron esas culturas y curiosamente un sentimiento de animosidad contra el imperior ya caido. En otros territorios, como EEUU o Al Andalus, ese sentimiento de animosidad no existen, algunos se creen q porque viven en el paraiso de la democracia y la paz.. pero en realidad es pq el genocidio fue tal q nadie sobrevivió, ni fue capaz de mantener esa cultura pre-existente.. De nuevo, todo esto muy lejos de la globalización de la q habla Stiglitz...

    Hace 2 años 11 meses

  2. braulio

    Hablando de protegerse de algunos efectos de la globalización (impuesta antidemocráticamente) mientras lo hacen en ingles globalizado.... le decía la sartén al cazo... Globalización cultural, militar, política, ideológica, epistémica, de transporte, relacional, industrial... como si hablasen de fenómenos naturales que nadie impone... ¿hay algún elemento más globalizado que la violencia y manipulación que globaliza el capitalista en términos culturales, aunque no solo en esos términos? ¿Qué hará la sociedad humana cuando gracias a la globalización de una sola cultura no pueda encontrar salidas a los problemas que ella misma genera? Tic, tac, tic, tac.

    Hace 2 años 11 meses

  3. Bernard MOREL

    Beneficiarse de un préstamo Desea beneficiarse de un crédito para salir de su difícil situación de la vida, desea pagar sus cuentas o diferentes deudas. Necesita dinero para llevar a cabo un proyecto, comprar una casa o comprar un automóvil. Por favor, póngase en contacto conmigo y recibirá un crédito muy rápido: bernamorel@outlook.fr

    Hace 2 años 11 meses

  4. José Lázaro

    Thanks for posting the original version!! My three cents: - Stiglitz is able to convey clear messages on complex topics... Glad to read him once and again. - He bets on the welfare state which Europe unfortunately we are now dismantling. - Corporations and Trump are playing short. We all know the political game, but in Corporate world, unfortunatelty, the problem is that the executives are far less loyal to the firm than most of their employees...

    Hace 2 años 11 meses

Deja un comentario


Los comentarios solo están habilitados para las personas suscritas a CTXT. Puedes suscribirte aquí